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THE LIABILITY OF THIRD 
PARTIES UNDER TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 applies primarily to 
the formation, conduct, and termination of employment rela-
tionships between employers and individuals.2 Frequently, how-
ever, third parties control-either by law3 or market struc-
ture4-an individual's access to employment11 or the terms of his 
employment with another employer.6 For example, assume that 
an association of professional golfers sponsors tournaments to 
demonstrate the skills of its members to prospective employers 
of golf pros, such as country clubs. The association, while not 
employing the golfers, would exercise considerable control over 
the access of its members to employment with other employers. 7 
Title VII explicitly covers two third parties that exercise con-
trol over an individual's employment with other employers: em-
ployment agencies8 and labor organizations.9 Plaintiffs, however, 
have used Title VII to attack discrimination by many other 
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)). 
2. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718 
n.33 (1978); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983). 
3. See, e.g., Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211, 213 & n.l 
(E.D. Va. 1976) (passing defendant's exam required to obtain license to practice law), 
aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979). 
4. See, e.g., Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 488 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (hos-
pital's granting of staff privileges improves doctor's ability to attract patients). 
5. See, e.g., Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(hospital prevented private-duty nurse from reporting to the patient to whom he had 
been referred). 
6. See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(insurance company administering university employees' retirement benefits reduced 
women's monthly payments through use of sex-based mortality tables), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983). 
7. See Naismith v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 558-60 (N.D. Ga. 1979). 
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(c), 2000e-2(b) (1982). 
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(d), 2000e-2(c) (1982). The Act also covers agents of employers, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), who are not really third parties, in that, by definition, they are 
subject to the control of the ultimate employer, see Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 
F.2d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3566 
(1983). 
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third parties. 10 Most courts have decided such cases on an ad 
hoc basis, and the lack of a rationale has led to conflicts over 
whether or not Title VII covers a particular defendant. 11 
10. One can divide the defendants in such actions into five major categories: (1) li-
censing agencies, see Darks v. City of Cincinatti, 745 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984); National 
Org. for Women v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lavender-
Cabellero v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); EEOC 
v. Supreme Ct. of N.M., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 448 (D.N.M. 1977); Delgado v. 
McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 729-30 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar 
Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd per curium, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 
1979); Lewis v. Hartstock, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 831 (S.D. Ohio 1976); 
Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974); EEOC 
Dec. No. 81-22, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1811 (1981); EEOC Dec. No. 75-249, 19 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1821 (1975); cf. Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory 
Therapy, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 246 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (board certified individu-
als for employment in hospitals); (2) insurance companies, see Peters v. Wayne State 
Univ., 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 
3566 (1983) (insurance company that administered plaintiff's retirement benefits); Spirt 
v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982) (same), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983); EEOC v. Sanders Chevrolet, 36 FAIR 
EMPL. PRAC. CAs. (BNA) 348 (D.N.M. Oct. 26, 1984); Crowder v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 
569 F. Supp. 825 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (insurance company that assisted employer in running 
its health insurance plan); (3) hospitals, see Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019 
(9th Cir. 1983) (hospital that denied plaintiff's employer's contract proposal); Sibley Me-
morial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1339-42, (D.C. Cir. 1973) (hospital that prevented 
plaintiff private-duty nurse from reporting to patient); Beverley v. Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 
1321, 1327-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (hospital that refused to grant doctor staff privileges); Pao 
v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 494-95 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (same); (4) govern-
ment agencies, see United States v. City of Yonkers, 592 F. Supp. 570, 589-92 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (state civil service commission that prepared exams that municipal employers 
could use at their option); Barlow v. AVCO Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269, 273-74 (E.D. Va. 
1981) (Department of Labor officials that supervised Job Corps center that employed 
plaintiff); Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 82 F.R.D. 379, 395-97 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (state civil service commission that prepared exams that municipal employers 
could use at their option); Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 689-97 
(D. Md. 1979) (civil service commission that examined applicants for entry-level posi-
tions); White v. North La. Legal Assistance Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1347, 1350-51 (W.D. La. 
1979) (federal agency that provided funding for employer); Gill v. Monroe County Dep't 
of Social Servs., 79 F.R.D. 316, 334 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (state civil service commission that 
designed exams given to applicants for county jobs); Curran v. Portland Superintending 
School Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1072-73 (D. Me. 1977) (city that appropriated funds 
to plaintiff's employer); and (5) miscellaneous, see Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711, 719-23 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (former employer that circulated adverse 
references concerning plaintiff); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 36 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. (BNA) 6, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984) (brokerage firm 
that used services of employee of employment agency that provided companies with tem-
porary personnel); People v. Holiday Inns, 35 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. (BNA) 1308, 1313 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1984) (corporation that franchised plaintiff's employer); Naismith v. 
Professional Golfers Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 558-60 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (professional associa-
tion that organized playing events to assist members in securing employment as golf 
professionals); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (trucking 
company that controlled plaintiff's access to opportunities to haul freight for other com-
panies), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978). 
11. Compare Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(imposing liability upon insurance company that administers employees' pension plans), 
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This Note considers the extent to which Title VII covers dis-
crimination by third parties other than employment agencies 
and labor organizations.12 Part I analyzes the rationale for cover-
ing third parties, discussing Title VIl's language and the policies 
that Congress intended it to serve. Part II proposes a framework 
for analyzing the liability of third parties. Part III applies this 
framework to three instances where courts have disagreed about 
the liability of a particular third party: insurance companies' ad-
ministration of employee benefits, state licensing agencies' li-
censing of individuals for various occupations, and hospitals' 
granting of staff privileges to doctors. 13 
vacated and remanded on other grounds; 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983) with Peters v. Wayne 
State Univ., 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982) (declining to impose such liability), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983). Compare, e.g., Puntolillo v. New 
Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974) (finding that Title VII 
covers state licensing agency) with, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Waterfront 
Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (declining to find such coverage). Compare 
Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that Title 
VII covers a hospital's denial of staff privileges to a doctor) with Beverley v. Douglas, 591 
F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (declining to find such coverage). 
12. In this Note, "third party" will refer to employers-other than employment agen-
cies and labor organizations-who have some degree of control over an individual's terms 
of employment or access to employment with another employer. "Actual" or "ultimate" 
employer will refer to the party for whom the individual was working or with whom the 
individual was seeking work. 
Courts interpreting Title VII have borrowed from National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) cases theories of "single" and "joint" employer liability. As one court explained: 
A "single employer" relationship exists where two nominally separate entities 
are actually part of a single integrated enterprise so that, for all purposes, there 
is in fact only a "single employer." The question in the "single employer" situa-
tion, then, is whether the two nominally independent enterprises, in reality, con-
situte only one integrated enterprise. 
NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982) (emphasis in origi-
nal); see Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. 
of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256-57 (1966) (per curiam) (adopting the National Labor 
Relations Board's (NLRB) standards for the single employer theory); Baker v. Stuart 
Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying the single employer theory to a 
Title VII case). On the other hand, in joint employer cases, the two entities are separate, 
but "they share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and condi-
tions of employment." Browning-Ferris, 691 F.2d at 1123 (emphasis in original); see 
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 36 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. (BNA) 6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984); 
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying joint em-
ployer notion in Title VII suit). For a discussion of this and several other issues relating 
to Title VII's definition of an employer, see Annot., 69 A.L.R. FED. 191 (1984). 
A recent article contains a brief discussion of some of the cases that raise the issue 
that this Note examines, see Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities 
and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 102-07 (1984), in the context of an examina-
tion of the definition of "employee" under Title VII, see infra note 58. 
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE RATIONALE FOR COVERING THIRD PARTIES UNDER 
TITLE VII 
Sections 703 and 704 of Title VII make unlawful various em-
ployment practices.14 To determine whether Title VII imposes 
liability on a party for discrimination against an individual 
whose access to employment with another employer the party 
controls, one must examine Title VII's language and the policies 
that Congress intended it to serve. 
A. The Statutory Language 
Section 703(a) prohibits various discriminatory acts by em-
ployers.15 An analysis of this section demonstrates that it pro-
hibits an employer from discriminating against an individual 
employed by or seeking employment with some other employer. 
Section 703(a) contains two subsections. Section 703(a)(l) makes 
it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment .... "16 In contrast, section 
703(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, 
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his sta-
tus as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin. "17 
One can infer from the language of these two sections that 
section 703(a)(l) imposes liability upon third parties, but that 
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1982). 
15. According to the Act, 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982) (emphasis added). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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section 703(a)(2) does not. While Title VII explicitly defines the 
term "employee,"18 section 703(a)(l) uses broader language, 
prohibiting discrimination against "any individual."19 One can 
conclude, therefore, that section 703(a)(l) protects persons other 
than current employees.20 Moreover, because Congress provided 
no reason to believe that "any individual" applies only to former 
employees and applicants for employment,21 one can further 
conclude that section 703(a)(l) prohibits a third party from dis-
criminating against any individual in his pursuit of employment 
with other employers, regardless of whether or not the third 
party ever employed or rejected the employment application of 
the individual. A comparison with section 703(a)(2) strengthens 
this conclusion; that section uses narrower language, limiting an 
employer's liability to improper classification of "his employees 
or applicants for employment."22 Because the language of sec-
tion 703(a)(l), but not that of 703(a)(2), provides a basis for a 
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). 
20. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (D.N.H. 1974). 
21. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Nor is 
there any good reason to confine the meaning of 'any individual' to include only former 
employees and applicants for employment."). 
As further justification for permitting suits against third parties, Sibley, the first case 
to address this issue, relied in part upon § 706(b), which allows any "person claiming to 
be aggrieved," as opposed to only employees, to file charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). The court con-
cluded: "The fact that the Act purports to provide remedi_es for a class broader than 
direct employees is a strong indication that the proscriptions contemplated by § 
703(a)(l) reach beyond the immediate employment relationship." 488 F.2d at 1341. A 
more natural conclusion, however, is that Congress used the "person aggrieved" language 
to allow rejected or discouraged applicants and dismissed or other former employees to 
file charges with the EEOC. See, e.g., Canham v. Oberlin College, 666 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 
1981) (rejected job applicant), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977 (1982); Satz v. ITT Fin. Corp., 
619 F.2d 738, 745 n.12 (8th Cir. 1980) (individual deterred from applying for job by 
defendant's discrimination); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (retired employee); Thompson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 84 F.R.D. 406, 
407 n.1 (D. Conn. 1979) (terminated employee). Congress's use of the "person aggrieved" 
language "shows a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted 
by Article III of the Constitution." Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d 
Cir. 1971); cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (giving 
same construction to similar language in § 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. § 3610(a)). Since the person claiming to be aggrieved must allege an unlawful 
employment practice under §§ 703 or 704, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982), Congress's 
grant of broad standing to assert such a claim does not affect the substantive question of 
whether or not a third-party's discrimination can violate § 703(a). 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). See EEOC Dec. No. 81-22, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1811, 1812 (1981) (contrasting § 703(a)(l) with § 703(a)(2)); EEOC Dec. No. 
79-32 (1979), CCH EEOC Dec. (1983) 11 9773 (same); EEOC Dec. No. 75-249, 19 Fair 
Empl. Prac. CaG. (BNA) 1821 (1975) (same). 
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cause of action by individuals against third parties that have 
discriminated against them, courts should limit such actions 
against third parties to employment practices that violate sec-
tion 703(a)(l). 
It is unclear whether limiting claims against third parties to 
those brought under section 703(a)(l) has any substantive im-
pact upon the types of claims that plaintiffs could bring. Section 
703(a)(l) definitely applies to cases of intentional discrimina-
tion, 23 where an individual either claims disparate treatment, in 
that an employer has treated him less favorably because of his 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,24 or claims that an 
employment practice, on its face, treats one class of employees 
differently from others.211 Whether section 703(a)(l) applies to 
disparate impact cases is less certain. Disparate impact cases 
arise when an employer's facially neutral employment practice, 
such as requiring that all job applicants pass a written exam, 
disproportionately affects a class of employees and is not job-
related. 26 The cases that developed the disparate impact theory 
have relied upon section 703(a)(2),27 conveying the impression 
that section 703(a)(l) does not lend itself to disparate impact 
analysis. 28 Recently, however, several cases have applied dispa-
rate impact analysis to section 703(a)(l) claims.29 Therefore, in-
dividuals can definitely bring cases of disparate treatment and 
facially discriminatory practices against third parties, and, if the 
recent trend continues, they will be able to bring disparate im-
23. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984) (relying upon § 
703(a)(l) in finding that female attorney stated claim by alleging that her employer de-
clined to invite her to become a partner because of her sex). 
24. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 
(1977); see, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (racially moti-
vated discharge). 
25. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 
(1978) (employer required women to contribute more money to its retirement fund than 
men of the same age). 
26. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (blacks performed worse 
than whites on general intelligence test used to determine promotions). 
27. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 426 n.l (1971). 
28. See Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 224, 231 (M.D. Tenn. 
1983). 
29. See EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); Wambheim v. 
J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3544 (1984); 
Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 1003 & n.l (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting); American Fed. of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Washington, 578 
F. Supp. 846, 856-57, 864 (W.D. Wash. 1983). Although the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly addressed this issue, it has stated that the substantive prohibitions of § 
703(a)(l) differ from those of § 703(a)(2). See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 & 
n.9 (1982); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1977). 
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pact cases as well. 
B. Congressional Purpose 
The legislative history of Title VII suggests that Congress did 
not specifically consider whether employers would be liable if 
they discriminatorily interfered with an individual's employ-
ment relationship with another employer. Ori the other hand, 
the debates over the 1964 Act and the 1972 Amendments to Ti-
tle VII indicate that Congress did pay considerable attention to 
the parties to whom the Act's protections and proscriptions 
would apply. The legislators proposed and debated amendments 
concerning several aspects of Title VII's coverage, including 
types of workers,30 individuals,31 and employers.32 Congress care-
fully delineated Title VII's coverage;33 courts should not tamper 
with it. 
If, however, Title VII defines the third party as an "em-
ployer,"34 then a court does not tamper with Title VII's coverage 
by holding the third party liable under section 703(a)(l). Rather, 
the court is merely defining broadly the unlawful employment 
practices of section 703(a)(l) so as to include a covered em-
ployer's discrimination against individuals when it controls 
those individuals' access to the job market or their terms of em-
ployment. Although this interpretation gives section 703(a)(l) a 
broad reading, the statutory scheme supports it; Congress's in-
clusion of employment agencies and labor organizations demon-
strates its awareness of the damage that third parties can cause 
through discrimination. 35 Since it has before it both a party-a 
covered employer-to which Title VII refers, and an activ-
ity-discriminatory exercise of control over employment rela-
tionships with other employers-that Title VII prohibits, a court 
does not reach very far by forbidding a covered employer that 
30. See 110 CONG. REC. 2728-29 (1964) (agricultural wor\ers); 118 CONG. REc. 3800-
02 (1972) (physicians and surgeons). 
31. See 110 CONG. REC. 2719-20 (1964) (Communists); 110 CONG. REc. 2607 (1964) 
(atheists). 
32. See il8 CONG. REc. 1977-95 (1972) (educational institutions and religious associa-
tions); ll8 CONG. REc. 1810-40 (1972) (state and local governments). 
33. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1977); National Org. for 
Women v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317, 321 (1979). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). 
35. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (D.N.H. 1974); 
EEOC Dec. No. 75-249, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1821, 1822 (1975). 
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has a relationship with an individual similar to that of an em-
ployment agency or labor organization from discriminating in a 
manner prohibited to those institutions. As one court stated: 
"To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances pecu-
liarly affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering 
with an individual's employment opportunities with another em-
ployer . . . would be to condone continued use of the very crite-
ria for employment that the Congress has prohibited. "36 
Congress could not have drafted a statute broad enough to en- . 
compass all the "peculiar circumstances" that might afford em-
ployers the opportunity to discriminate. In order to prevent am-
bigl,lOUS language and unanticipated circumstances from leaving 
discrimination unremedied, courts have consistently construed 
Title VII in ways that help effect Congress's purpose of elimi-
nating invidious and irrelevant characteristics as criteria for em-
ployment decisions37 and have often fashioned theories to help 
implement this goal.38 Moreover, when presented with two 
facially valid interpretations of Title Vll's language, courts 
choose the one most consistent with the goal of eliminating dis-
crimination.39 Reading Title VII to prohibit the discriminatory 
36. Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
37. See, e.g., Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 130-31 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (disparate-treatment 
theory); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (disparate-impact theory); Baker 
v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977) (adopting the standards of the 
National Labor Relations Board to determine whether it should consolidate separate en-
tities for the purposes of Title VII). 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court held that facially neutral 
employment practices that have a disparate impact upon minorities violate the Act un-
less job-related. In amending Title VII, Congress indicated its approval of Griggs, see 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982), and the Senate committee noted: "In 
1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distin-
guishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable indi-
vidual or organization. . . . Employment discrimination today is a far more complex phe-
nomenon." S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971); see H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2137, 2143-
44; see also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 383 
& n.7 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The reports cite this complexity as a basis for 
strengthening the power of the EEOC, see H.R. REP. No. 238, supra, at 8-10, reprinted 
in 1972 U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS, supra, at 2144-46, their favorable citation of 
Griggs implying approval of that case's fashioning of a theory to deal with a circum-
stance that the Congress, by its own admission, did not foresee. Discrimination by third 
parties other than employment agencies and labor organizations would seem to qualify 
as one of the complexities that Congress would want the Commission and courts to ad-
dress. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 211 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (approving "arguable violation" theory as "respon[sive] to a practical problem in 
the administration of Title VII not anticipated by Congress"). 
39. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981) ("We must ... 
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activities of third parties helps effect Congress's purpose of elim-
inating discrimination from the job market and the work place.''0 
In sum, the following factors provide the rationale for holding 
employers liable under Title VII when they discriminate against 
an individual whose access to a job or terms of employment they 
control, even though they do not employ that individual. First, 
section 703(a)(l) indicates that Title VII includes an employer's 
discrimination against persons other than its own employees. 41 
Second, third parties exert control over the employment oppor-
tunites of individuals in ways similar to employment agencies 
and labor organizations, entities that Title VII covers explic-
itly. 42 Third, Congress intended courts to interpret Title VII in a 
manner that would help achieve the goal of eliminating discrimi-
nation, since it could not draft a statute to cover all the complex 
and peculiar ways in which employment discrimination can 
arise. 43 These factors will aid the analysis of cases that involve 
third parties' liability under Title VII. 
II. DEFINING THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
Developing a framework for analyzing cases that raise the is-
sue of third party liablility first requires an examination of some 
of the ancillary issues that have arisen or might arise in such 
litigation. Then, combining the resolution of these issues with 
the rationale set forth in Part I, this Part will propose an analyt-
ical framework. 
A. Issues Arising in Third-Party Litigation 
Several issues have arisen concerning the parties and prereq-
avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, 
without clear congressional mandate."). 
In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court held that exclusion of 
pregnancy as a covered risk in an employer's disability plan did not constitute gender-
based discrimination. Id. at 137-40. The Congress responded by amending Title VII to 
overturn the Court's decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), the House committee 
noting its belief "that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the Act." H.R. REP. 
No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
4749, 4750. The Gilbert episode warns against narrow interpretations of Title VII. 
40. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22. 
42. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
43. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40. 
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uisites to a suit against a third party under Title VII. Resolution 
of these issues will define the limits to the cause of action of an 
individual against a third party. 
1. The "Employer" Status of the Third Party- Courts 
should only impose liability upon defendants that Title VII de-
fines as employers. Section 703(a)(l), from which the cause of 
action arises, refers to acts of discrimination by "an employer,"44 
a term defined in section 701(b).45 This requirement gives effect 
to Congress's careful enumeration of the parties it wished Title 
VII to cover.46 If the third party is not an employer, then the 
courts simply do not have jurisdiction over the action.47 
2. "Employer" Status of the Ultimate Employer- Several 
courts have imposed liability upon a third party even though it 
interfered with an individual's relationship with a party that 
section 701(b)48 does not define as an employer.49 For example, 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). 
45. Section 701(b) defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... , and any agent of such a person." 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). Section 701(a) defines a "person" as "one or more individu-
als, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partner-
ships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock 
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in [bankruptcy cases], 
or receivers." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). 
46. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. The dicta of some courts have failed to 
distinguish between a broad definition of the term "employer" and a broad definition of 
what employers are prohibited from doing. For example, one court stated: "the term 
'employer' under Title VII has been construed in a functional sense to encompass per-
sons who are not employers in conventional terms, but who nevertheless control some 
aspect of an individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 
Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983); accord United States v. City of Yon-
kers, 592 F. Supp. 570, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Vanguard Justice Soc'y v. Hughes, 471 F. 
Supp. 670, 696 (D. Md. 1979). This statement ignores both Congress's explicit definition 
of the word "employer," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982), and the legislative history, 
which "indicates that the term 'employer' is 'intended to have its common dictionary 
meaning, except as expressly qualified by the act.'" Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 
870 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7216 (1964) (statement of Senator Clark)). 
In determining whether or not the third party is an "employer," the court should rely 
exclusively upon § 701(b). If that section defines the third party as an employer, then the 
court can invoke third-party liability, if otherwise appropriate. See Bonomo v. National 
Duckpin Bowling Congress, 469 F. Supp. 467, 470 n.2 (D. Md. 1979). 
47. See Bonomo v. National Duckpin Bowling Congress, 469 F. Supp. 467, 470 
("[T]he number of employees is a jurisdictional prerequisite .... "); Lewis v. Hartstock, 
18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 831, 835 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (declining to impose liability 
upon board of bar examiners because it was not an employer under § 2000e(b)). 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). 
49. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ultimate 
employer a patient in a hospital); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 494 
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (ultimate employers doctor's "prospective patients"); see also Gomez v. 
Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983) (ultimate employer plaintiff's own 
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in two cases, courts have held a hospital liable for interfering 
with the relationship between health professionals and their pa-
tients.110 Section 701(b) does not define the patients in these 
cases as employers: they neither employ fifteen or more individ-
uals nor do they engage in an industry affecting commerce.111 
Nevertheless, courts should allow an individual to maintain an 
action against a third party that blocks access to an employment 
relationship with a party that Title VII does not define as an 
employer. 
An analogy to employment agencies-who control individuals' 
access to the job market in a manner similar to that of other 
third parties52-supports the conclusion that individuals can 
maintain an action against third parties even when section 
701(b) does not cover the ultimate employer. Title VII does not 
limit employment agencies' liability to cases of discriminatory 
referrals to covered employers,53 and applying this determina-
tion to the liability of other third parties makes sense. When a 
third party controls an individual's access to employment, that 
individual should have the same rights as a person using an em-
ployment agency: to gain access to the job market on a nondis-
criminatory basis, regardless of whether or not the ultimate em-
ployer could avoid liability under Title VII. 
The policy that underlies Title VII-assuring equality of em-
ployment opportunities114-also supports the preceding conclu-
sion. To give effect to this policy, courts construe narrowly Title 
VII's exemptions. 55 In the case of the exemption for employers 
professional corporation; number of employees unclear); Puntolillo v. New Hampshire 
Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974) (ultimate employer horse owner; num-
ber of employees unclear). 
50. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Pao v. Holy 
Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). 
52. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
53. Cf. Brennan v. Aldert Root, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1643 (E.D.N.C. 
1974) (interpreting nearly identical provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1982)); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.3(a) (1984) (EEOC interpreta-
tion of ADEA). 
54. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). 
55. See, e.g., Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936, 941 (D. 
Colo. 1979); Gearhart v. Oregon, 410 F. Supp. 597, 600 (D. Or. 1976); cf. Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (holding that Congress intended the bona fide occu-
pational qualification "to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of sex"). The only exemption that the courts have construed 
broadly is § 703(h), which permits employers "to apply different standards of compensa-
tion, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide 
seniority or merit system .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982); see, e.g., Firefighters 
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2587-90 (1984). However, in construing § 
703(h), courts have had to balance the policies of Title VII against a national labor pol-
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with less than fifteen employees, Congress limited Title VII's 
coverage to protect very small businesses from government in-
trusion. 56 Applying Title VII to covered employers does not im-
plicate the policy behind this exemption. Therefore, no rights 
ought to accrue to covered third parties from the ultimate em-
ployer's exemption. 57 
3. The Nature of the Relationship Interfered With-
Courts should only hold third parties liable for interfering with 
relationships that Title VII defines as employment. For exam-
ple, courts should not allow actions against third parties who in-
terfere with an individual's prospective independent contractor 
relationship, because Title VII does not protect individuals 
when they enter into such a relationship.58 Thus, courts have 
icy of determining conditions of employment through collective bargaining. See Califor-
nia Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980). 
56. See 118 CONG. REC. 2409-11 (1972) (statement of Senator Fannin). 
57. In Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court 
wished to prevent "a covered employer" from exploiting circumstances giving "it the 
capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individual's employment opportunities 
with another employer." Id. at 1341 (emphasis added). One can infer from this language 
that the court was requiring the third party, but not the ultimate employer, to be cov-
ered by § 701(b). 
58. See, e.g., EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983); Cobb v. Sun Pa-
pers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); Lutcher v. Musi-
cians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 1980); Spiridies v. Reinhardt, 613 
F.2d 826, 828-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979). But see Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339-42 
(6th Cir. 1983) (2-1 decision). In Spirides, the court stated that: 
the extent of the employer's right to control the "means and manner" of the 
worker's performance is the most important factor .... If an employer has the 
right to control and direct the work of an individual, not only as to the result to 
be achieved, but also as to the details by which that result is achieved, an em-
ployer/employee relationship is likely to exist. 
Additional matters of fact that an agency or reviewing courts must consider 
include, among others, (1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the 
work usually is done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist 
without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) 
whether the "employer" or the individual in question furnishes the equipment 
used and the place of work; (4) the length of time during which the individual 
has worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the 
manner in which the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both parties, 
with or without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) 
whether the work is an integral part of the business of the "employer"; (9) 
whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the "em-
ployer" pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. 
613 F.2d at 831-32 (footnotes omitted). 
The court in Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983), took a different 
approach. It relied upon NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), which 
held that the definition of employee under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
must be viewed in light of "the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained." 322 
U.S. at 124 (quoting South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Basset, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940) 
(quoting Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934))). Congress overruled Hearst Publi-
cations by amending the NLRA to specifically exclude independent contactors. See 29 
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held that Title VII does not apply to insurance salespersons 
when their only compensation comes from commissions and 
when they remain free to set their own hours.59 Section 703(a) 
limits protection to employment relationships by prohibiting 
discrimination in hiring, firing, and "compensation, terms, con-
ditions or privileges of employment,"60 and forbidding classifica-
tion of employees that results in deprivations of "employment 
opportunities."61 Title VII forbids employment discrimination. 
Title VII does not make employers liable for interfering with an 
individual's independent contractor relationships any more than 
it makes them liable for interfering with an individual's other 
contractual relationships, such as renting an apartment or bor-
rowing money.62 
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). The court in Armbruster relied upon Congress's failure to place a 
similar exclusion in Title VII, 711 F.2d at 1341 n.7, and it remanded to the district court 
"to determine whether the [plaintiffs] are susceptible to the kind of unlawful practices 
that Title VII was intended io remedy. If they are so, then they must be included as 
employees .... " Id. at 1342. See generally Dowd, supra note 12; Comment, The Defi-
nition of "Employee" Under Title VII: Distinguishing Between Employees and Inde-
pendent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203 (1984). 
59. See, e.g., Dixon v. Burman, 593 F. Supp. 6, 8 & n.8 (N.D. Ind. 1983), aff'd mem., 
742 F.2d 1459 (7th Cir. 1984). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982) (emphasis added). 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). 
62. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the conclusion reached above, that the 
third party may be liable even if the ultimate employer does not fit within § 701(b)'s 
definition of an employer. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text. That conclu-
sion merely prevents a party from avoiding liability because of another party's statutory 
exemption. In that case, a court would be exercising jurisdiction over a party, a covered 
employer, and a relationship, employment, that Title VII contemplates. In the indepen-
dent contractor cases, on the other hand, the relationship blocked is simply outside the 
scope of Title VII. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 
1980) (stating that "there must be some connection with an employment relationship for 
Title VII protections to apply"). 
Only two cases have explicitly addressed this issue. In Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 
410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978) the court 
held that blocking access to an independent contractor relationship did not violate the 
Act. 410 F. Supp. at 517-18 & n.11. A recent case has followed the decision in Smith, see 
Beverley v. Douglas, 591 F. Supp. 1321, 1327-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and the dicta of other 
cases support this conclusion, see Lutcher, 633 F.2d at 883; Mathis v. Standard Brands 
Chem. Indus., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 295, 297 n.2 (1975); cf. Lutcher, 633 F.2d 
at 884 (holding that union's interference with individual's independent contractor rela-
tionship does not violate Title VII). Other courts, however, have found third parties lia-
ble in situations where the relationship blocked was arguably not one of employer-em-
ployee. See Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (private-
duty nurse-patient); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
(doctor-patient). While neither of these courts made specific findings as to the nature 
of the relationship interfered with, both characterized it as one of employment. See Sib-
ley, 488 F.2d at 1342 (hospital controlled plaintiff's "access to the patient for purposes of 
the initiation of such employment"); Pao, 547 F. Supp. at 494 (defendant controlled 
"plaintiff's access to those prospective patients who are his ultimate 'employers' "). 
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B. Analytical Framework 
The courts that have faced the issue of third party liability 
have not addressed the issue in a systematic manner. The lack 
of a framework has led to several conflicts over the application 
of Title VII to third parties63 and to a generally confused ap-
proach to the issue. A framework through which courts should 
analyze cases involving third parties can be derived from the ra-
tionale developed in Part I and the issues addressed above. 
1. Threshold Questions- According to the first part of the 
rationale, the statutory language authorizes suits against em-
ployers when they discriminatorily interfere with an individual's 
employment relationship with another party. The statute re-
quires that a court address three threshold questions before de-
ciding whether to impose liability upon a third party. The court 
must determine that (1) section 701(b) defines the third party as 
an "employer";64 (2) the third party committed the type of dis-
crimination actionable under section 703(a)(1);65 and (3) the 
third party interfered with a relationship that Title VII defines 
as employment.66 If the court does not find that all three condi-
tions are met, then it should dismiss the claim; if it does, then it 
must conduct a further examination to determine the appropri-
ateness of subjecting the third party to liability under Title VII. 
2. Causation- Third parties may control an individual's ac-
cess to the job market in a manner analogous to that of employ-
ment agencies and labor organizations.67 Such control consti-
tuted the second part of the rationale for extending Title VII 
liability to employer third parties.68 Therefore, the third party in 
question should have a nexus with an individual's employment 
opportunities that is similar to that of the third parties that Ti-
tle VII explicitly covers. In essence, a court must make a causa-
tion inquiry, and it should determine whether or not the third 
party's discrimination interfered in a direct and substantial way 
with the plaintiff's access to employment or his terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment with another employer.69 
63. See cases cited supra note 11. 
64. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 23-29. 
66. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
68. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
69. See Barlow v. AVCO Corp., 527 F. Supp. 269, 274 (E.D. Va. 1981). In Sibley 
Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court found that the de-
fendant's relationship to the plaintiff's employment opportunities was like that of em-
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3. Congressional Intent- According to the third part of the 
rationale, imposing liability upon third parties would help rid 
the job market of discrimination that manifested itself in ways 
that the Congress did not anticipate. 70 Therefore, a court must 
determine that the third party in question did not operate in a 
manner sufficiently visible that one must assume that Congress, 
despite knowledge of the third party's role in the job market, 
chose not to include it. This will give effect to two somewhat 
contradictory sections of Title VII: Congress's enumeration of 
employment agencies and labor organizations as third parties 
subject to Title VII,11 and its use of the "discriminate against 
any individual" language of •section 703(a)(l).72 The contradic-
tion arises because that language alone would, under the analy-
sis of Part 1,73 suffice to include the referral activities of employ-
ment agencies and labor organizations if they happened to be 
employers under section 701(b); they would be "employers" who 
"otherwise ... discriminate against any individual."74 It is un-
likely, however, that Congress intended to cover the referral ac-
tivities of employment agencies and labor organizations in such 
an indirect manner. The inquiry suggested here assumes that 
the enumeration of employment agencies and labor organiza-
tions provides evidence of Congress's intent to exclude equally 
notorious third parties from coverage for their third party 
activity. 
In sum, to be liable under Title VII, a third party must (1) be 
a covered employer as defined by section 701(b); (2) commit an 
act of discrimination that, if committed against one of its own 
employees, would be actionable under section 703(a)(l); (3) in-
terfere with a relationship that Title VII defines as employment; 
(4) directly and substantially control an individual's access to or 
terms of employment with another employer; and (5) not have 
such a well-known impact upon the job market that Congress's 
failure to enumerate the third party in section 703 does not pro-
ployment agencies and labor organizations. The court characterized that relationship as 
"not a remote but a highly visible nexus with the creation and continuance of direct 
employment relationships." Id. at 1342. 
70. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
71. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(b), (c) (1982). 
72. Compare Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 
(D.N.H. 1974) (emphasizing the "discriminate against any individual" language and, 
therefore, imposing liability upon state licensing agency) with National Org. for Women 
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (emphasizing the enumer-
ation of employment agencies and labor organizations and, therefore, declining to impose 
liability upon a state licensing agency). 
73. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. 
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). 
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vide evidence of a legislative intent to exclude its third party 
activities from coverage. 
III. APPL YING THE FRAMEWORK 
The issue of third party liability has arisen in a variety of Ti-
tle VII cases. This Part uses the framework developed in Part II 
to examine the applicability of third party liability to insurance 
companies that provide employee benefits, state licensing agen-
cies, and hospitals that grant physicians staff privileges. 
A. Insurance Companies 
In Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity 
and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris,7r, the Supreme 
Court held that an employer may not off er its employees, as a 
retirement option, an annuity that pays women lower monthly 
benefits than men. Although the Court did not have the issue 
before it, two courts of appeals have split over whether or not 
insurance companies that administer these annuities are them-
selves liable under the Act.76 
Both cases involved the same insurance company, Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA), which contracted to 
provide retirement annuities to employees at over three thou-
sand educational institutions.77 Although TIAA contracted di-
rectly with the employees, the employers (named as defendants 
in both actions) matched their employees' contributions.78 Upon 
retirement, TIAA paid women less each month than men of the 
same age. Because, on average, women live longer than men, 
TIAA paid members of both sexes benefits of equal actuarial 
value. In Norris, however, the Court subsequently ruled that the 
75. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983). 
76. Compare Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding in-
surance company not liable), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3566 
(1983) with Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding 
insurance company liable), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3565 
(1983). The Court remanded both cases for further consideration in light of Norris. Pe-
ters was inconsistent with Norris because it held that the plan itself did not violate Title 
VII; Spirt's awarding of a limited amount of retroactive relief was arguably inconsistent 
with Norris's holding that any relief should be prospective. See infra note 94. 
77. See Peters, 691 F.2d at 237. 
78. Id. 
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employer's participation in this practice violated Title VII. 79 
The two circuit courts took different approaches to the ques-
tion of TIAA's liability under Title VII for its practice, reaching 
different results. In Spirt u. Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association,80 the Second Circuit held that TIAA was "so closely 
intertwined" with the plaintiffs' actual employer that it "must 
be deemed an 'employer' for the purposes of Title VIl."81 On the 
other hand, in Peters u. Wayne State Uniuersity,82 the Sixth 
Circuit found that Title VII did not cover the activities of TIAA 
for two reasons. First, the court noted that TIAA "[did] not 'em-
ploy' the plaintiffs in the conventional sense. "83 Second, the 
court found that TIAA was not the agent of the actual employer, 
because the employer did not delegate to TIAA the determina-
tion of any aspect of its employees' compensation and exercised 
no control over TIAA's decision to use sex-segregated mortality 
tables.84 
In reaching the exact opposite results concerning identical 
facts, both courts engaged in cursory analysis. An analysis 
through the framework developed above should result in a more 
considered decision. 
The framework makes an insurance company a candidate for 
liability under the Act.85 First, section 701(b) defines it as an 
employer.86 Second, by offering annuities that paid lower 
monthly benefits to women, the insurance company committed 
an act that, if committed against its own employees, would have 
constituted an unlawful employment practice in violation of sec-
tion 703(a)(l).87 Third, the plaintiff's relationship with the uni-
79. 103 S. Ct. at 3496-3502. 
80. 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983). 
81. Id. at 1063. 
82. 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983). 
83. Id. at 238. 
84. Id. 
85. The insurance companies may have a defense under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982), which provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be con-
strued to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose 
of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 
475 F. Supp. 1298, 1301-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd in part, aff'd on other grounds, 691 
F.2d 1054, 1063-66 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 
3565 (1983). See generally Note, Title VII Clashes With McCarran-Ferguson in the 
Pension Arena, 41 U. P1TI. L. REV. 859 (1980). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). While neither court made an explicit finding on the 
issue, TIAA presumably employed many more than 15 employees, since 550,000 employ-
ees at over 3000 academic institutions contracted with TIAA for retirement benefits. See 
Peters, 691 F.2d at 237. 
87. See Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensa-
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versities was one of employment. 88 
Applying the last two aspects of the framework, however, 
poses more difficulty. The first of these requires that the court 
determine whether or not the insurance company directly and 
substantially controlled the employee's benefits. Unlike most 
cases involving a third party's liability under Title VII, where 
the ultimate employer has not practiced discrimination and re-
mains free from liabilty,89 here the ultimate employer's decision 
to use the insurance company's services makes it liable under 
Title VII for the insurance company's actions.90 In such a case, a 
court should determine whether the third party is merely follow-
ing the employer's instructions or is acting sufficiently indepen-
dently that the imposition of liability may affect its behavior.91 
tion Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3496-97 (1983) (holding that use of sex-segregated 
mortality tables violated § 703(a)(l)); see also Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1058. 
88. There is no indication that the plaintiffs in Spirt and Peters were anything other 
than common-law employees. 
89. For example, in the cases challenging state licensing agencies, e.g., Puntolillo v. 
New Hampshire Racing Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974), the plaintiffs ~id not 
claim that those employers with whom the plaintiffs would have sought employment dis-
criminated against them in any way. 
An analogy to labor organizations demonstrates why the individuals in those cases had 
no cause of action against the ultimate employers. In the 1964 Senate debate over Title 
VII, Senator Joseph Clark, one of the bill's floor managers, responded in writing to a 
question raised by Senator Dirksen about the liability of employers using hiring halls. 
According to Senator Clark, "[i]f the hiring hall discriminates against Negroes, and sends 
[the employer] only whites, [the employer] is not guilty of discrimination, but the union 
hiring hall would be." 110 CoNG. REC. 7217 (1964); cf. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. 
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391-97 (1982) (holding employer utilizing hiring hall not lia-
ble under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) for hiring hall's discrimination in absence of intent to 
discriminate by the employer). 
90. See Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3501; Peters, 691 F.2d at 238; see also City of Los Ange-
les Dep't of Water & Power ·v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718 n.33 (1978). 
91. In Crowder v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 825 (M.D.N.C. 1983), the court 
refused to impose liability upon a third-party insurance company that assisted the em-
ployer in running its health insurance program. The court found that the insurance com-
pany's role was purely advisory, stating that it had "no authority or control ... over the 
running of the [employer's) group insurance program .... "Id.at 828. The court distin-
guished Spirt because the district court in that case found that the employers' delegation 
of authority to TIAA had resulted in the insurance company's having control over an 
aspect of the employee's compensation. Id. at 828; see Spirt, 475 F. Supp. at 1308. 
It is possible that if a court found that an insurance company was acting under the 
control and direction of the employer, then the court might find that the insurance com-
pany was the employer's agent, and, therefore, liable under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(b) (1982). Courts have usually used Title VII's coverage of agents to establish ju-
risdiction over supervisory employees, see, e.g., Jeter v. Boswell, 554 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. 
W. Va. 1983), but have had few opportunities to apply agency principles to a contractual 
relationship between two independent companies. 
In Peters, the court applied common-law agency principles and found that TIAA was 
not Wayne State's agent, noting that the University "exercise[d) no control over [TIAAJ, 
otherwise essential to a principal agent relationship." 691 F.2d at 238. On the other 
hand, this same circuit has held that the term "employee" must be defined in light of the 
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If the court finds such independence, it should hold that the in-
surance company's actions have met the causation test. 
The framework's final criterion requires the court to decide if 
Congress meant to exclude insurance companies from coverage 
by its enumeration of employment agencies and labor organiza-
tions as explicitly covered third parties.92 While this is a close 
question, Congress probably did not mean to exclude insurance 
companies. The legislative history provides no evidence one way 
or the other, but it is reasonable to assume that Congress might 
not have foreseen this delegation of responsibility for employee 
compensation. Although Title VII imposes liability upon em-
ployers for the actions of those to whom they delegate responsi-
bility for their employees' benefits,93 holding those committing 
the discriminatory acts directly liable helps rather than hinders 
the statutory scheme. Imposing liability upon independently 
acting insurance companies gives those companies a direct in-
centive to comply with Title VIl.94 
purposes of the Act, not common law. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 
(6th Cir. 1983), discussed supra note 58. 
For several reasons, it seems that a similarly broad definition of "agent" would help 
effect the policies of the Act. First, the_party in question might be necessary for complete 
relief. See EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566, 575 (6th 
Cir. 1984); Crowder v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 825, 828-29 (M.D.N.C. 1983); 
see also Jeter, 554 F. Supp. at 952 & n.20 (rejecting supervisory employee's argument 
that his dismissal from case would not prejudice plaintiff because the employer was a co-
defendant). Second, holding the party liable will encourage it to comply with the Act. 
See Jeter, 554 F. Supp. at 952 n.20 (stating that failure to hold supervisory employees 
liable would encourage them "to violate Title VII with impunity"). Finally, as one court 
noted, "it is inconceivable that Congress could have intended to exclude from liability 
the very persons who have engaged in the employment practices which are the subject of 
the action." Dague v. Riverdale Athletic Ass'n, 99 F.R.D. 325, 327 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
In EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1984), 
the Sixth Circuit missed an opportunity to address this question. The Wooster Brush 
Company provided half the funding for the Employees Relief Association (the other half 
came from the members' dues). The Association was a voluntary membership organiza-
tion for the employees of the company, formed to provide benefits to disabled employees. 
The Association did not pay for disability arising from pregnancy. See EEOC v. Wooster 
Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1258-59 (N.D. Ohio 1981), reu'd on other grounds, 727 
F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1984). The district court found the Association liable under the single 
employer theory of Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977), see 
supra note 12, but the court of appeals reversed. 727 F.2d at 571-73. The EEOC had 
argued alternatively that the Association was the agent of the company. The district 
court acknowledged that argument, 523 F. Supp. at 1260, 1261, but, having found liabil-
ity under the single employer theory, it simply did not address the agency argument. 
The court of appeals stated, inexplicably, that the district court "concluded that ... an 
agency relationship did not exist .... " 727 F.2d at 571. 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74. 
93. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718 
n.33 (1978). 
94. The plaintiffs in Spirt and Peters undoubtedly named TIAA as a defendant be-
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B. State Licensing Agencies 
Professional and occupational licensing agencies erect barri-
ers-often impenetrable-to an individual's pursuit of employ-
ment opportunities in his chosen field. 95 Backed by the coercive 
power of the state, a licensing agency prevents an individual who 
fails a licensing exam from practicing his occupation, even if em-
ployers and customers exist who wish to hire him.96 Evidence 
shows that these exams often have a disparate impact upon ra-
cial minorities.97 In addition, individual licensing officials may 
exercise discretion over the granting of a license and, therefore, 
cause if they were to win damages, they would have needed TIAA for complete relief. 
After the Supreme Court held that only prospective relief would be awarded, see Arizona 
Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 
103 S. Ct. 3492, 3509-10 (1983); see also id. at 3512 (O'Connor, J., concurring), it seemed 
that the issue of third party liability was moot since, if applied directly to the insurance 
companies, prospective relief would mean only that they could no longer utilize sex-seg-
regated mortality tables, a requirement which, in light of Norris, they would have had to 
meet anyway to market their product to covered employers. 
The Second Circuit's treatment of the case on remand, however, has revived the issue. 
TIAA argued that, because it had begun to use unisex mortality tables for post-August 1, 
1983 contributions (the date that the judgment in Norris was handed down, see 103 S. 
Ct. at 3494), the court should dismiss the case as moot. See Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & 
Annuity Ass'n, 735 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984). The court 
disagreed with this contention, stating that in Norris, the C()urt applied relief prospec-
tively because it felt that retroactive relief would have required "topping up" women's 
benefits to the level of men's, imposing a severe financial burden upon the employer. 735 
F.2d at 26 (citing Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510 n.11). The Spirt court stated that, in the 
case before it, equalizing benefits would not require topping up, because, unlike the situ-
ation in Norris, TIAA had never promised prospective annuitants a definite level of ben-
efits upon retirement. Id. at 27. The court, therefore, reasoned that TIAA could equalize 
benefits by a combination of reducing men's and increasing women's payments, without 
depriving prospective male annuitants of any reasonable expectation of benefits. The 
court concluded that the equalization could take place as of the date of the district 
court's initial decision without costing TIAA any money, which the court felt was Nor-
ris's main concern. 
The insurance company's liability under Title VII will also be relevant when, as is 
likely, the plaintiffs in Spirt and Peters seek attorneys fees under § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(k) (1982). See Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 
1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
The Sixth Circuit has not yet reconsidered its decision in light of Norris. See Peters v. 
Wayne State Univ., 718 F.2d 1100, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11 33,896 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(remanding the case to the district court for further consideration in light of Norris). 
95. See Gellhorn, Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 6, 13-19 
(1976). 
96. See B. SHIMBERG, B. ESSER & D. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES 
ANO POLICIES 235 (1973). 
97. For example, a study of aspiring cosmetologists in Missouri and Illinois found 
that while blacks did nearly as well as whites on the practical exam, blacks failed the 
written exam at a much greater rate. See Dorsey, The Occupational Licensing Queue, 15 
J. HUM. RESOURCES 424 (1980). 
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may inject their own biases into the licensing process. 
Several cases have addressed the issue of the liability of li-
censing agencies under Title VII. For example, in Puntolillo u. 
New Hampshire Racing Commission,98 the plaintiff, a driver-
trainer of harness race horses, alleged that the defendant denied 
him a license to race because of his national origin. The court 
held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action. The 
court addressed two of the three threshold questions of the 
framework proposed in Part II. It found that section 701(b) de-
fined the defendant as an employer,99 and it quoted section 
703(a)(l) in its analysis of the plaintiff's claim.100 It did not, 
however, determine whether the plaintiff's relationship with his 
ultimate "employers," the horse owners, would have been an 
employment or an independent contractor relationship.101 The 
court also implicitly found that the defendant directly and sub-
stantially interfered with the plaintiff's employment opportuni-
ties, characterizing the procurement of a license as "critical."102 
The court did not, however, address the question of whether 
Congress intended to include the licensing activities of state li-
censing agencies as a possible unlawful employment practice. 
Rather, the court noted only that the 1972 amendments to Title 
VII made the defendant an "employer" under section 701(b).103 
On the other hand, the court in National Organization for 
Women u. Waterfront Commission10" seized upon the issue of 
congressional intent. In NOW, the plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendant denied them the licenses they needed for cargo checker 
jobs because of their sex.105 In analyzing the issue of whether the 
defendant's licensing activity fell within the proscriptions of Ti-
tle VII, the court noted that Congress "meticulous[ly] 
enumerat[ed] ... the categories of entities covered by the Act 
•••• "
106 The court concluded that Title VII did not apply, 
doubting that Congress "would have left to speculation and con-
98. 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1973). 
99. Id. at 1092. 
100. Id. at 1091. 
101. The court did state that the owners "hire and fire and pay the driver-trainers 
and, as a practical matter, stand in the shoes of an employer vis-a-vis the driver-train-
ers." Id. at 1090 (footnote omitted). In discussing Puntolillo, however, the court in Smith 
v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Cal. 1976), alf'd mem., 580 F.2d 1054 (9th 
Cir. 1978), noted that "[a]rguably, ... a driver-trainer who works for a horse owner is an 
independent contractor." Id. at 518 n.11. 
102. Puntolillo, 375 F. Supp. at 1091. 
103. Id. at 1092. 
104. 468 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
105. Id. at 318. 
106. Id. at 321 (footnote omitted). 
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jecture any desire to subject to federal regulation city and state 
licensing activities of which it was obviously aware."107 
An analysis within the framework prescribed in Part II dem-
onstrates that licensing agencies do not fit within the theory of 
third-party liability. Applying the framework, the licensing 
agency does meet at least three of the criteria for coverage as a 
third party. First, section 701(b) defines a licensing agency as an 
employer.108 Second, in many cases the agency will be granting 
licenses to persons who will then seek to enter into relationships 
that Title VII defines as employment.109 Third, the licensing 
agency controls directly and substantially the job market of in-
dividuals seeking licenses. no A fourth criterion, that the third 
party commit an act of discrimination of a type actionable under 
section 703(a)(l), depends upon the claim being brought. Indi-
viduals surely can bring disparate treatment claims against state 
licensing agencies, but they may be unable to maintain disparate 
107. Id. 
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Section 701(a) defines "person" to include "govern-
ments" and "government agencies." A licensing agency could employ over fifteen indi-
viduals and, therefore, be an employer in its own right, liable for discrimination against 
its own employees, and a proper defendant in a Title VII action, see ,Miller v. Texas 
State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). 
Moreover, even if the agency employs less than fifteen persons, the Act might still cover 
it as an agent of the state. See Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 
211, 213 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1976) (finding a state licensing agency an agent of state), aff'd per 
curiam, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979); accord Aguilera v. Cook County Merit Bd., 21 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 731 (BNA) (N.D. Ill. 1979), rev'd mem., 661 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1981); cf. 
Adams v. Leatherbury, 388 So. 2d 510, 512 (Ala. 1980) (finding a state agency an agent of 
the state under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). But see Rogero v. Noone, 
704 F.2d 518 (11th Cir. 1983); cf. Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (holding that town employing less than fifteen persons not covered by Title 
VII). The Seventh Circuit apparently reversed the district court's Aguilera opinion on 
grounds other than jurisdiction, see Aguilera v. Cook County Merit Bd., 582 F. Supp. 
1053, 1054 (N.D. Ill. 1984), and one can distinguish Dumas from Woodard because the 
town in Dumas was an independent political subdivision, not an agent of the state. The 
court in Rogero held that, for the court to have jurisdiction over the agent, the plaintiff 
had to join the principal as a co-defendant. Title VII's language, however, imposes no 
such requirement, and the concurring judge in Rogero felt that the proper inquiry was 
whether the facts confirmed the allegation of agency status. See 704 F.2d at 521-22 
(Clark, J., concurring). 
109. For example, denying an individual a license to practice law will deprive that 
individual of many opportunities that are in the nature of employment, such as being an 
associate at a law firm or a lawyer for a corporation or the government. 
110. Practicing an occupation without a license is often a criminal offense. See, e.g., 
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 339.601 (West Supp. 1984-85). One court, which found that 
Title VII did not cover the licensing activities of the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, 
noted that the Board "exercise[d] complete control over the plaintiffs' access to the at-
torney job market within the Commonwealth of Virginia." Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of 
Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211, 213 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1345 
(4th Cir. 1979). 
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impact claims.111 
The fifth criterion, whether or not Congress intended to ex-
clude the party from coverage, requires a more extensive exami-
nation. The legislative history of Title VII provides some guid-
ance. The congressional debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
indicates that Congress did not intend Title VII to apply to bar 
associations, 112 which, due to their control over access to the le-
gal profession, stand in an analogous position to lawyers as li-
censing agencies do to practitioners of licensed occupations. 
Moreover, the debates and reports concerning the extension of 
Title VII's coverage in 1972 often mention that Title VII would 
now cover millions of state and local government employees.113 
However, neither the proponents nor, more significantly, the op-
ponents of the extension mentioned the possibility that license 
applicants would fall within the Act's protection.114 The oppo-
nents of the 1972 Amendments predicted dire consequences 
from the Amendments' enactment.115 These opponents likely 
111. See supra note 29. 
112. During the debate, Congressman Cahill of New Jersey introduced an amend-
ment to prohibit unions from accepting members on any basis other than job qualifica-
tions. In the course of the debate over this amendment, which the House eventually 
rejected, the following exchange took place between Cahill and Congressman Dent of 
Pennsylvania: 
Mr. Dent. If I understand the gentleman right you would go beyond just a labor 
organization. You might take in a professional association that practices that 
sort of discrimination, as you call it. 
Mr. Cahill. No. That is not the fact. 
Mr. Dent. I want to clarify this situation. In Pennsylvania, for instance, a stu-
dent may enter a law school, he may graduate from that law school, and the local 
bar association can prevent him from practicing law in any specific county al-
though he has passed the bar, graduated from college, yet the bar association 
committee on admittance will bar him for something he had nothing to do with. 
Mr. Cahill. I understand the gentleman's question, and I understand the situa-
tion as it exists in Pennsylvania. I will say this is an amendment to § 704 subsec-
tion (1) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982)) which reads that it shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for a labor organization. The bar association is not 
included. 
Mr. Dent. I do not think the gentleman's amendment is germane to the purpose 
of the act anymore than if I offered an amendment to prevent a bar association 
from admitting only approved applicants. 
110 CONG. REC. 2593 (1964). 
113. See 118 CONG. REC. 1816 (1972) (statement of Senator Williams); see also Na-
tional Org. for Women v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(citing thr legislative history). 
114. See National Org. for Women v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317, 320 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
115. Senator Ervin predicted that extending the Act's coverage to state and local gov-
ernments would result in Federal judges appointing professors at public universities, 118 
CONG. REC. 1678 (1972), and taking jurisdiction over the election of state and local offi-
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would have mentioned the coverage of state licensing agencies 
had they considered such coverage a possibility.116 
The licensing of professions provides an example of an activity 
sufficiently well known that one should presume that Congress 
knew of the activity and chose not to cover it. This conclusion 
comports with the assumption that Congress does not intend to 
encroach upon state authority by implication.117 While Title VII 
may define a licensing agency as an "employer,"118 liable-like 
many employment agencies119 and labor organizations120-for 
discrimination against its own employees, the licensing agency 
focuses primarily-like employment agencies and labor organi-
zations-upon the screening of individuals for other employers. 
Licensing agencies, therefore, present an instance where courts 
should interpret Congress's enumeration of employment agen-
cies and labor organizations as exclusive.121 
cials, id. at 18::18. 
116. See National Org. for Women v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317, 320 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
117. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276-77 
(1975); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 
U.S. 79, 84 (1939); Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 131 F.2d 953, 965 
(2d Cir. 1942); National Org. for Women v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317, 321 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lavender-Caballero v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 458 F. Supp. 
213 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 
16 (1981). 
118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
119. B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 656 (2d ed. 1983). 
The EEOC claims that Title VII prohibits an employment agency from discriminating 
against its own employees regardless of whether the employment agency is an "em-
ployer" as defined by § 701(b). See EEOC Dec. No. 71-1598 (1971), CCH EEOC Dec. 
(1973) 11 6271; cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.3(b) (interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act). 
120. B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 119, at 618; see Rosser v. Laborers' Int'l 
Union, 616 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980). 
121. See National Org. for Women v. Waterfront Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 317, 321 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). This conclusion works less hardship upon those alleging intentional dis-
crimination by a licensing agency, see, e.g., Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing 
Comm'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H. 1974), than those bringing disparate impact claims, 
see, e.g., Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976), 
aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff claiming intentional racial 
discrimination may retain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). See Delgado v. 
McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1977). But see Golden Rule Life Ins. Co. v. 
Mathias, 88 Ill. App. 3d 323, 333, 408 N.E.2d 310, 317-18 (1980) (holding that § 1981 
does not apply to the granting of a license). However, courts have held that § 1981 does 
not prohibit sex discrimination, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976); Bobo 
v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 933 
(1982), national origin discrimination, see Thomas v. Roher-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp. 
669, 671 (N.D. Ill. 1984); but see Stroud v. Seminole Tribe, 574 F. Supp. 1043, 1046 (S.D. 
Fla. 1983), or religious discrimination, see Reese v. Abbott Laboratories, 493 F. Supp. 
185 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 119, at 674-77. 
On the other hand, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff could bring a suit against the 
FALL 1984) Third Parties Under Title VII 191 
C. Hospital Staff Privileges 
People enter into and perform a variety of contracts on the 
premises of a hospital. 122 These include many contracts other 
than those between the hospital and its employees. For example, 
a surgeon will operate upon a patient and bill him directly. As a 
consequence, several third party liability cases have involved 
hospitals as defendants. 123 Two of these cases have reached op-
posite conclusions about whether a hospital's discriminatory re-
fusal to grant a doctor staff or admitting privileges violates Title 
vn.12, 
In both cases, Pao u. Holy Redeemer Hospital1 25 and Beverley 
u. Douglas,126 the physicians claimed that the hospitals denied 
them staff privileges by reference to discriminatory criteria.127 
They further claimed that this denial adversely affected their re-
lationship with their "employers," i.e., their patients.128 There-
fore, the physicians charged that the hospitals' discrimination 
members of a licensing agency for discrimination based upon any of the critera-race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin-that Title VII covers. See B. ScHLEI & P. GRoss-
MAN, supra note 119, at 684-85. However, plaintiffs could not bring either a§ 1981 or a§ 
1983 action against a licensing agency alleging the disparate impact of the agency's ex-
aminations without alleging discriminatory purpose. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n 
v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (holding that only "purposeful" discrimination 
is actionable under § 1981); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (holding 
Title VII disparate-impact analysis inapplicable to equal protection claims); see also id. 
at 248 & n.14 (expressing concern that disparate-impact analysis would invalidate licens-
ing statutes) (citing Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation, and Racial Dis-
crimination, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1972)). 
In its regulations on employee selection procedures, the EEOC acknowledges the split 
in authority over the coverage of licensing activities: "These guidelines apply to tests and 
other selection procedures which are used as a basis for any employment decision. Em-
ployment decisions include ... licensing and certification, to the extent that licensing 
and certification may be covered by Federal equal employment opportunity law." Uni-
form Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(8) (1984). 
122. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 491, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (1944). 
123. See Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(hospital rejected plaintiff's employer's proposal to operate the hospital's emergency 
room because several of the physicians would have been Hispanic); Sibley Memorial 
Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (hospital refused to allow male private-
duty nurse to report to female patient to whom he had been referred); Beverley v. Doug-
las, 591 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (hospital denied plaintiff's application for admit-
ting privileges); Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (hospital 
refused to grant plaintiff staff privileges). 
124. Compare Beverley, 591 F. Supp. at 1327 (refusing to impose liability upon a 
hospital) with Pao, 547 F. Supp. at 494 (holding hospital liable for discriminatory denial 
of staff privileges). 
125. 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
126. 591 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
127. See Beverley, 591 F. Supp. at 1323; Pao, 547 F. Supp. at 488. 
128. See Beverley, 591 F. Supp. at 1327, 1328 n.24; Pao, 547 F. Supp. at 494. 
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violated Title VII under the theory of third party liability. 
In Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hospital, 129 the court denied the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the doctor's claim of national origin 
discrimination, holding that the plaintiff alleged facts analogous 
to those of Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson. 130 In Sibley, the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that a male private duty nurse 
stated a claim under Title VII when he alleged that the staff 
nurses at the hospital refused to allow him to report to a female 
patient to whom a registry had referred him.131 The court in Pao 
held that the hospital in the case before it "had the same capac-
ity as the defendant in Sibley to control the plaintiff's access to 
those prospective patients who are his ultimate 'employers.' "132 
In Beverley v. Douglas,133 the court rejected the physician's 
argument that a hospital's discriminatory denial of staff privi-
leges was actionable under Title VII. The court reasoned that 
even if the hospital interfered with plaintiff's chances of at-
tracting patients, the doctor-patient relationship was an inde-
pendent contractor, and not an employment, relationship. The 
court therefore granted the defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion, stating that "[i]n order to invoke Title VII, plaintiff must 
allege and prove some link between the defendant's actions and 
an employment relationship."134 
An application of the framework proposed in Part II demon-
strates that the court in Beverley dealt properly with the issue 
before it. First, section 701(b) defines the hospital as an "em-
ployer."135 Second, the hospital has committed an act of discrim-
ination that, if committed against an applicant for employment, 
would constitute a violation of section 703(a)(l). 
The doctors' claims, however, do not meet the third require-
ment, that Title VII define the relationship interfered with as 
employment. As the court in Beverley noted, and as the plaintiff 
in that case apparently conceded, the relationship between doc-
tors and patients is the "classic independent contractor" rela-
tionship. 136 The doctor is free to set his own hours and fees, and 
the patient retains no control over the manner in which the doc-
tor conducts his affairs. Title VII plaintiffs must show some con-
129. 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
130. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
131. Id. at 1340-42. 
132. Pao, 547 F. Supp. at 494. 
133. 591 F. Supp. 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
134. Id. at 1328 (footnote omitted). 
135. See Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983); Sibley, 
488 F.2d at 1340. 
136. See 591 F. Supp. at 1328. 
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nection between the defendant's discriminatory conduct and in-
terference with an employment relationship. 137 Because a doctor 
claiming a discriminatory denial of staff privileges cannot 
demonstrate such a connection, courts should not impose Title 
VII liability upon hospitals for discrimination in their decision 
to grant such privileges.138 
CONCLUSION 
Given the broad purposes of Title VII, courts must often, 
when they interpret its language, fill in gaps, clarify ambiguities, 
and resolve .contradictions. The liability of third parties presents 
a problem that requires courts to perform all of these tasks. The 
failure of many courts, however, to follow the rationale for hold-
ing third parties liable has led to conflicts in the application of 
the theory of third party liability. The framework proposed in 
this Note provides criteria to determine third parties' liability 
consistent with the rationale for third party liability under Title 
VII. Application of the framework discloses that courts should 
impose liability upon insurance companies that provide em-
137. See Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) 
("there must be some connection with an employment relationship for Title VII protec-
tions to apply"). 
138. In Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), the 
plaintiff was a doctor of Hispanic decent who practiced through a professional corpora-
tion. The plaintiff submitted a contract proposal to the hospital for his corporation to 
operate the hospital's emergency room. The hospital rejected the offer and the plaintiff 
sued, alleging that the hospital refused the proposal because five of the twelve physicians 
would have been Hispanic. The court of appeals held that the allegations stated a claim 
under Title VII. The court's conclusions can be worked into the framework proposed in 
this Note. First, the hospital was an employer under section 701(b). Second, through an 
act of intentional discrimination, it interfered with the plaintiff's relationship, which was 
one of employment, with another employer: his own professional corporation. Third, the 
court found causation, stating: "The conditions of plaintiff's employment are different 
than they would have been had he not been discriminated against." 698 F.2d at 1021. 
Fourth, because the court quoted the "peculiar circumstances" language from Sibley, 488 
F.2d at 1342, the court may have felt that the plaintiff's predicament was one of those 
situations not anticipatable by Congress. 
One can question the court's "application" of the final part of the test. In effect, 
Gomez gives employees of minority-owned businesses a Title VII cause of action against 
firms that discriminatorily reject their employers' contract proposals. It seems doubtful 
that Congress intended that Title VII create such a far reaching action. But see Note, 
Title VII Protection for Minority-Owned Businesses, 30 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1978). 
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ployee benefits, but courts should not apply third party liability 
to state licensing agencies or to hospitals that grant physicians 
staff privileges. 
-Andrew 0. Schiff 
